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Platform 01 · Engineering Assurance IntelligenceStatus: Research & Architecture

AEAIP™ Aerospace Engineering Assurance Intelligence Platform

Know what is verified. Know what is missing. Know when the system is ready.

  1. Requirement
  2. Configuration
  3. Evidence
  4. Verification
  5. Readiness
Explore Interactive Assurance DemoDiscuss AEAIP™
Research & Architecture. AEAIP is not released software. This page describes what it is designed to do; the interactive demo uses fictitious data. Every capability below carries its current status.

What is AEAIP?

AEAIP is the Aerospace Engineering Assurance Intelligence Platform being researched and architected by Gamyaa AeroSystems. It is designed to connect engineering requirements, the exact configuration being evaluated, verification evidence and review decisions, so that teams can see what is verified, what is missing and what stands between them and the next readiness gate.

Made by
Gamyaa AeroSystems, Bangalore, India
Initial engineering focus
Satellites & Spacecraft
Status (October 2026)
Research & Architecture · not released

The problem AEAIP addresses

Can we prove that this critical system is ready?

Requirements live in one tool, configuration in another, test reports in a third, and NCRs, anomalies and waivers in a fourth. Before every review, engineers rebuild the connections by hand.

The hard part is rarely producing evidence. It is knowing whether the evidence you have still proves what you need, for the exact system you are about to test, ship or fly.

Requirement & configuration

  1. 01What needs to be proven, and which requirement defines it?
  2. 02Which system, subsystem or component implements it?
  3. 03Which exact configuration is being evaluated?

Verification & evidence

  1. 01How will it be verified: test, analysis, inspection, demonstration or simulation?
  2. 02What evidence exists, and is it complete?
  3. 03Is that evidence still applicable to the current configuration?

Issues & closure

  1. 01Are there unresolved anomalies, NCRs, deviations or waivers?
  2. 02Has corrective action been completed?
  3. 03Has the retest or re-analysis been performed?

Authority & readiness

  1. 01Has an authorized person reviewed the evidence?
  2. 02Can the requirement legitimately be closed?
  3. 03What remains open before the next engineering review or readiness gate?

Core engineering model

Requirement → Configuration → Evidence → Verification → Readiness

Configuration sits between requirement and evidence on purpose: evidence proves a requirement only for the configuration it was produced on.

  1. 01

    Requirement

    What must be proven?

    The stakeholder, system and derived requirements, with their source, revision and allocation.

  2. 02

    Configuration

    Which exact system is being evaluated?

    Requirement baseline, hardware and software revisions, test article and tool versions.

  3. 03

    Evidence

    What objective evidence exists?

    Test, analysis, inspection, demonstration and review records, with provenance.

  4. 04

    Verification

    Does the evidence close the requirement?

    Results assessed against criteria, open issues resolved and closure reviewed by a person.

  5. 05

    Readiness

    What stands between us and the next gate?

    Open items, conditions and risks, presented to the board that makes the decision.

Core technology 01

Engineering Evidence Graph™

The traceability and engineering-context model. Every node knows its revision, its configuration, where it came from and who approved it, so the graph can be walked from a mission need to a test result and back.

Status: Architecture Data model in definition.

How the Engineering Evidence Graph works
Engineering Evidence Graph™ — node chainFIG. EEG-1

  1. Intent

    1. 01Mission / Need
    2. 02Stakeholder Requirement
    3. 03System Requirement
    4. 04Derived Requirement

  2. Design

    1. 05Architecture
    2. 06Subsystem / Component
    3. 07Interface
    4. 08Design Artifact

  3. Configuration

    1. 09Configuration
    2. 10Implementation / Manufacturing

  4. Verification

    1. 11Inspection · Analysis · Simulation · Demonstration · Test
    2. 12Raw Evidence

  5. Issues

    1. 13NCR · Anomaly · Risk · Deviation · Waiver
    2. 14Corrective Action
    3. 15Retest / Re-analysis

  6. Authority

    1. 16Verification Closure
    2. 17Authorized Approval
    3. 18Review / Certification / Mission Readiness

Traversable in both directions: down from a need to the evidence that satisfies it, and up from any test result to every requirement and review it supports. Original GAMYAA model; status: Architecture.

Core technology 02

Assurance Intelligence Engine™

Reasons over the Engineering Evidence Graph to show coverage, gaps, stale evidence, configuration mismatches and what blocks the next gate. It prepares the picture. People make the decision.
Assurance Intelligence Engine™ — where it sitsFIG. AIE-1
  1. 01Engineering systems + engineering evidence
  2. 02Engineering Evidence Graph™
  3. 03Assurance Intelligence Engine™
  4. 04Engineer / Review Board / Authorized AuthorityHuman decision
  5. 05Readiness Decision

What it is designed to help identify

  • Verification coverage
  • Missing evidence
  • Stale evidence
  • Configuration mismatches
  • Unverified requirements
  • Open tests
  • Failed tests
  • NCRs
  • Anomalies
  • Waivers
  • Risks
  • Cybersecurity findings
  • Change impact
  • Review-gate readiness

The engine prepares findings. It never closes a requirement, accepts a risk or makes the readiness decision. Status: Research.

Human authority model

AI assists. Engineers verify. Authorized authorities approve.

AI is an enabling capability inside engineering workflows, not a separate platform and not an approver.

  1. 01

    AI assists

    Interprets requirements, suggests trace links, classifies evidence and drafts gap lists. Every suggestion is labelled and reviewable.

  2. 02

    Engineers verify

    Engineers accept, correct or reject each suggestion, assess results and propose closure.

  3. 03

    Authorized authorities approve

    Closure, risk acceptance and readiness are recorded decisions by named, authorised people: a chief engineer, review board, quality or certification authority.

AI in AEAIP never

  • Certify an aircraft
  • Approve a spacecraft for flight
  • Replace the Chief Engineer
  • Provide regulatory approval
  • Autonomously declare a system safe

Initial engineering focus

Satellites & Spacecraft

Architected broadly, proven deeply in one domain first. A spacecraft programme connects nearly every assurance discipline in one product, on one schedule, with no chance to repair it after launch.
Satellite and spacecraft assurance in depth

One programme, every discipline

  • Mission requirements
  • Systems engineering
  • Hardware
  • Software
  • Avionics
  • Power
  • Thermal
  • Structures
  • ADCS
  • Communications
  • Payloads
  • Cybersecurity
  • Manufacturing
  • Environmental qualification
  • Integration
  • Test
  • Mission readiness
  • Operations
  • Telemetry

First deep implementation

Satellites & spacecraft

Later expansion directions

Launch systems, defence aerospace systems, aircraft and advanced aerospace systems. The architecture is intended to apply; these implementations do not exist yet.

Configurable Assurance Gates

Readiness, gate by gate

AEAIP does not hard-code one organisation's lifecycle. Each programme defines its reviews, their order, entrance and success criteria, and the evidence each one needs. The satellite demo uses the illustrative sequence below.
  1. MCRMission Concept Review
  2. SRRSystem Requirements Review
  3. SDRSystem Definition Review
  4. PDRPreliminary Design Review
  5. CDRCritical Design Review
  6. SIRSystem Integration Review
  7. TRRTest Readiness Review
  8. SARSystem Acceptance Review
  9. ORROperational Readiness Review
  10. FRRFlight Readiness Review
  11. MRRMission Readiness Review

Illustrative satellite lifecycle. Review names, order, entrance criteria, success criteria and required evidence are configured per programme. MRR = Mission Readiness Review in this GAMYAA model.

What each review is for, and the evidence it needs

Verification methods

From inspection to hardware-in-the-loop

AEAIP is designed to hold evidence from classical, model-based, software, security and operational verification in one model. Methods are selected per requirement and programme.
The verification method taxonomy

  • Classical verification

    Inspection · Analysis · Demonstration · Test

  • Extended aerospace assurance

    Qualification · Acceptance · Similarity / heritage · Review of design · +2 more

  • Model-based and digital verification

    MBSE-supported verification · Physics-based simulation · Monte Carlo / uncertainty analysis · Model-in-the-loop (MIL) · +6 more

  • Software assurance

    Requirements-based testing · Unit verification · Integration verification · System verification · +6 more

  • Cybersecurity assurance

    Threat modelling · Security requirement verification · Secure-design review · Static application security testing · +11 more

  • Operational evidence

    Telemetry · Health monitoring · Anomaly evidence · Actual mission performance · +1 more

Specialized assurance platforms

Manufacturing and certification assurance, inside one architecture

AEAIP owns the system-level chain from requirement to readiness. Two specialised platforms provide depth where the evidence is most demanding.
  • Platform 02 · Manufacturing Assurance IntelligenceStatus: In Development

    DAQIP™

    Defence Aerospace Quality Intelligence Platform

    Drawing intelligence, First Article Inspection and AS9102 workflows, inspection and measurement evidence, supplier quality, NCR and deviation evidence, and quality approval. In AEAIP terms: the evidence that the product was built to its design.

    Explore DAQIP™
  • Platform 03 · Certification Assurance IntelligenceStatus: Planned

    AirCert AI™

    Airworthiness Certification Engineering Copilot

    Certification basis, airworthiness requirements, compliance and verification planning, safety and qualification evidence, compliance matrices and approval workflows. In AEAIP terms: the evidence a certification authority reviews.

    Explore AirCert AI™

Cybersecurity assurance

Security is part of assurance

A security finding is handled like an NCR: traced to the requirement and configuration it affects, remediated, retested and closed by an authorised reviewer.

Status: Research

Cybersecurity as engineering assurance
  1. 01Security Need
  2. 02Security Requirement
  3. 03Threat / Risk
  4. 04Allocated Control
  5. 05Architecture / Component
  6. 06Configuration
  7. 07Verification Method
  8. 08Security Test / Analysis Evidence
  9. 09Finding / Vulnerability
  10. 10Remediation
  11. 11Retest
  12. 12Verification Closure
  13. 13Authorized Security / Engineering Review

Key differentiator

Configuration-Aware Evidence Validity

Evidence is not useful merely because it exists. AEAIP is designed to determine whether evidence applies to the exact requirement baseline, hardware and software configuration, test article and verification context now under review.
Configuration-aware evidence validityFIG. CAV-1

Requirement

SAT-EPS-014

The EPS shall terminate battery charging at 4.10 V ±0.02 V per cell between 0 °C and 40 °C.

  1. June

    Verified

    Verified in June by test report TR-EPS-114 (pass)

  2. Since

    Configuration changed

    Five items in the evidence's configuration no longer match the baseline under review.

  3. Now

    Evidence validity: At Risk

    The June evidence was produced on a different configuration.

  4. Engineer

    Reverification Required

    Delta analysis shows the charge-termination logic changed, so the test must be repeated.

Configuration of the June evidence compared with the current baseline
ItemEvidence produced onCurrent baseline
RequirementRev 2 (±0.02 V)ChangedRev 3 (±0.015 V)
Battery management firmwareBMS FW 2.3.0ChangedBMS FW 2.4.0
EPS boardPCB Rev BChangedPCB Rev C
EPS–OBC interfaceICD Rev CChangedICD Rev D
Test procedureTP-EPS-022 Rev AChangedTP-EPS-022 Rev B

Fictitious requirement and values. The change list is detected automatically in this concept; deciding that reverification is required is an engineering judgement.

Why verified evidence can stop being valid

Continuous Engineering Assurance

When something changes, see what it touches

Instead of re-checking readiness before each review, AEAIP is intended to follow each engineering change through the graph as it happens.
Continuous Engineering Assurance — illustrative change impactFIG. CEA-1

Engineering change

Flight computer processor board revised (Rev D → Rev E)

AEAIP follows the change through the Engineering Evidence Graph: requirements allocated to the board, evidence produced on Rev D, and reviews that rely on that evidence.

  • 12

    requirements affected

  • 4

    verification results potentially invalidated

  • 3

    tests may require rerun

  • 2

    qualification artefacts affected

  • 1

    cybersecurity assessment affected

  • TRR readiness

    Changes from GO to GO WITH CONDITIONS

Illustrative result on sample data, to explain the concept. Continuous assurance is at Concept status; this is not a released capability.

Change impact, suspect evidence and reverification

Operational evidence

Predicted → Tested → Flown

One requirement, followed from the model that predicted it, through the test that measured it, to the telemetry that shows how it actually behaved. Digital twins and telemetry are evidence sources inside AEAIP, not separate platforms.
Predicted → Tested → FlownFIG. PTF-1

  1. Requirement

    THM-008

    Battery 5 °C to 30 °C in all operating modes

    Requirement

  2. Predicted

    Thermal model, hot case

    27.5 °C predicted

    Simulation / digital twin

  3. Tested

    Qualification TVAC, hot plateau

    28.9 °C measured; model correlated (+1.4 °C)

    Ground qualification

  4. Accepted

    Flight unit acceptance TVAC

    28.4 °C measured

    Acceptance

  5. Flown

    Flight telemetry, first 90 days

    21 °C to 26 °C observed

    Operational evidence

Fictitious values. Operational evidence is a long-term direction (Concept); no telemetry integration exists today.

Simulation, qualification and flight telemetry as one evidence chain

Interactive demo

Are we ready for TRR?

Explore a fictitious small satellite: pick a review gate and a subsystem, open an issue, and follow it from requirement to authorised review. Then watch verified evidence become stale when the configuration changes.
Explore Interactive Assurance Demo

Illustrative engineering assurance demonstration. Not a flight-safety or certification determination.

GX-1 · TRR readinessSample data

Illustrative readiness recommendation

GO WITH CONDITIONS

Requirements verified
362 / 496
Evidence gaps
1
Open NCRs
1
Configuration mismatches
2
Pending tests
2
Cybersecurity findings
1
Critical anomalies
0
  • StructureREADY
  • EPSCONDITIONAL
  • ADCSCONDITIONAL
  • ThermalREADY
  • AvionicsCONDITIONAL
  • CommsREADY
  • PayloadREADY
  • Flight SWCONDITIONAL
  • CyberCONDITIONAL

Illustrative readiness recommendation based on sample data. Not a flight-safety or certification determination.

Standards and integration philosophy

Standards & framework mapping

Map to frameworks. Never claim them.

AEAIP is designed to map engineering evidence and workflows against applicable engineering, assurance, quality, safety, cybersecurity and certification frameworks. Mapping evidence to a framework is not the same as compliance with it, and AEAIP holds no compliance certification.

Standards & framework mapping

Integration philosophy

Status: Roadmap

Keep the engineering systems that already work.

Requirements, PLM, MBSE, test and quality systems remain the systems of record. AEAIP is intended to provide a connected assurance view across their evidence. No integrations are implemented today.

How AEAIP intends to complement existing tools

Status as of October 2026

What exists, and what does not

Research and roadmap items are never presented as released capability.

Product evolution — maturity stages, no dates

  1. Stage 1 · Current

    Evidence Foundation

    Requirements · Configuration · Evidence relationships · Verification matrix · Human approval

    Status: Research & Architecture

  2. Stage 2 · Near-term

    Verification Intelligence

    Coverage · Gaps · Evidence validity · Readiness views

    Status: Research

  3. Stage 3 · Research

    Continuous Assurance

    Change impact · Suspect evidence · Reverification

    Status: Concept

  4. Stage 4 · Research

    Cross-Domain Assurance

    Manufacturing (DAQIP™) · Certification (AirCert AI™) · Cybersecurity · Software · System integration

    Status: Concept

  5. Stage 5 · Long-term Vision

    Operational Assurance

    Simulation · Ground test · Flight telemetry

    Status: Long-term Vision

  6. Stage 6 · Long-term Vision

    Predictive Assurance

    Risk patterns · Likely verification problems · Readiness threats

    Status: Long-term Vision
The AEAIP roadmap and strategy

AEAIP knowledge

Learn the engineering behind AEAIP

Reference pages written to teach first: verification, reviews, configuration, security and spacecraft assurance.

GAMYAA AeroSystems — Engineering Assurance Research · Designed by Sudarshana Karkala, EV.ENGINEER™ (opens in a new tab) · Last reviewed

Bring us a real readiness problem.

We are researching AEAIP with engineering teams. Tell us how your programme decides it is ready for its next review.
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